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Abstract
I investigate the relationship between perception of public institutions and tax com-
pliance using a large tax compliance laboratory experiment conducted in Italy and the
United States. In the first test, I conduct a simple tax compliance game to uncover that
given the exact same decisions, contributions to the public good do not differ between
Italy and the United States. Secondly, I ask participants to pay taxes to their national
government, pension fund, and fire department. In these rounds, behaviors diverge
with Italian participants complying significantly less than Americans. Theoretically,
I provide evidence demonstrating that how individuals perceive their institutions is
a crucial component of the tax compliance decision. Methodologically, I provide a
unique experiment, which can help us to better explain cross-country variation in tax
compliance, by asking subjects to make country-specific tax decisions.
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More Bang for Your Buck
The ability of states to successfully extract revenue from their residents is one of the most
fundamental features of modern states, and yet, states’ fiscal capacity varies greatly across
countries. The roots of a specific tax compliance environment rest on the reciprocal re-
lationship between person and state. States must provide clear and consistent rules and
signals, as well as public goods. Individuals can reciprocate by contributing to the state
through taxation, voting, and through other forms of civic engagement. Indeed, the basis
for our social contract derives from this exchange. In this study, I examine this particular
dynamic between perception of public institutions and tax compliance, utilizing a large tax
compliance laboratory experiment conducted in Italy and the United States. I argue that
institutional quality matters, and specifically, the perception that institutions are good (bad)
will affect the tax compliance environment considerably. Although I do not directly test the
relationship between institutional quality and trust, I suggest that much of the variation
in tax compliance that we observe across countries can be explained by differing levels of
institutional quality, and in that, the trustworthiness of those institutions.
Piggybacking off of a large category of institutionalist literature, I argue that human behavior
and decisions are not made independent of the context in which people live. Institutional
incentives structure behavior (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992), but those behaviors
are contingent on how individuals perceive their institutions (Levi 1997: 21): For example,
is the tax authority effective at carrying out efficient audits and punishing those who evade
their taxes? Is the tax authority fair? And is the tax authority trustworthy? Indeed, there
is a host of literature that demonstrates taxpayers are contingently compliant, meaning that
they are more willing to pay their taxes if they believe their institutions are efficient and
effective (Frey and Torgler 2007; Torgler and Schneider 2009; Frey and Feld 2002; Levi,
Sacks, and Tyler 2009; Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey 1994; Smith and Stalans 1991; Scholz
and Lubell 1998; Levi 1989). Simply put, taxpayers are looking to get the most bang for
their buck. According to Michael L. Ross (2004), “Both the size of the tax burden, and
the quality and quantity of government spending matter; citizens ultimately care about the
‘price’ they pay for the government services they receive.”
Individuals’ choices are thus framed by the institutional context in which they reside. Insti-
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tutions are defined as the basic rules and constraints that individuals follow such as formal
constitutions, laws, governing bodies, as well as informal rules such as social norms (North
1991). Institutional context refers to the quality of these formal and informal institutions.
Therefore, an Italian’s taxpayer behavior will be shaped by a different institutional context
than that of an American. For this reason, although Italians, for example, believe paying
taxes is a moral duty – slightly more than subjects in the U.S. (See Figure A.1 in Appendix)
– tax evasion is much higher in Italy. Italians show little trust in their government (See
Figure A.2 and Table 1 in Appendix) and pay a high price for government services. While
the United States collects considerably less tax revenue as a percent of GDP than the OECD
average, Italy has one of the highest tax burdens in the OECD (Tax Policy Center 2017).
Even with only slightly lower levels of confidence in government, as depicted in Table 1, the
tax burden in the U.S. is almost half the tax burden in Italy. If people are indeed willing to
pay for the quality and quantity of services that they receive (Ross 2004) then Italians should
also be less tax compliant than Americans. As Bergman (2009: 10) elegantly puts it, “People
maximize utilities inasmuch as they pay as little taxes as they can. But the environment in
which people operate fundamentally shapes how they frame the maximization tenets.”
[Table 1 about here.]
Taxpayer behavior is thus a dynamic process between the rational equilibrium of “paying as
little as I can” and the institutional context. If the fiscal, institutional, and administrative
capacity is effective in deterring utility maximization behavior, while providing an insti-
tutional environment that fosters a positive perception of government, a high-compliance
equilibrium can thrive. On the other hand, if fiscal/institutional capacity is weak, shaping
disaffection towards political and public institutions, a low-compliance equilibrium is more
likely.
A team of researchers and I designed our study to test this dynamic process by utilizing
a tax compliance experiment. We conducted these experiments between 2015 and 2017
in eight experimental laboratories with almost seven-hundred subjects. Our team spent
almost a year designing and redesigning these experiments so that we were holding the
3
More Bang for Your Buck
treatments constant across languages and cultural differences. But because we chose to run
these experiments in so many locations with such a large number of subjects, we also had
to make some methodological sacrifices, such as reordering treatments. In the end, we chose
to engage our subjects by giving individuals in different countries with vastly different real
world behaviors regarding taxation (on average) a set of “abstract” tax decisions (similar to
most tax compliance experiments) and a set of tax decisions which were linked to their real
public institutions.
This paper thus makes both a theoretical and methodological contribution to the litera-
ture. Theoretically, I provide evidence demonstrating that tax compliance decisions are not
independent from the institution to which we contribute. How individuals perceive their
institutions is a crucial component of the tax compliance decision. Methodologically, we
provide a unique experiment, which can help us to better explain cross-country variation in
tax compliance, by asking subjects to make country-specific tax decisions.
To preview my results: I uncover that given the exact same institutions, Italians are just as
tax compliant as Americans. But when respondents are asked to pay taxes to their real-world
institutions, Italians become less compliant than Americans.
1 Institutional Quality and Trust
Collecting taxes is one of the most basic functions of government, yet it is also arduous for
many countries. Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) influential study provided tax authorities
and scholars with a simple model that could be easily adapted. It assumes that taxpayers
are largely constrained by the probability of being caught cheating and the severity of the
penalty. In other words, if the benefits from evasion outweigh the costs, the taxpayer will
likely evade.
This parsimonious model helps to explain some of the underlying features of tax compli-
ance and evasion (see (Dubin and Wilde 1988), but it also has important drawbacks. For
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example, a number of studies demonstrate that audit rates and penalties are insufficient in
deterring tax evasion (Frey and Feld 2002; Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998; Graetz and
Wilde 1985; Torgler 2002). For example, both the U.S. and Sweden have audit probabilities
of less than 1%, but evasion tends to be relatively low. Italy, on the other hand, has a
relatively high audit probability, but evasion in Italy is significantly higher than in most
developed countries. Moreover, whether the deterrence model is effective is highly contin-
gent on the credibility and the legitimacy of the administration. As, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and
Wahl (2008: 212) nicely state, “when tax authorities make it known that they were more
efficient in detecting tax fraud and in bringing justice, the trust honest taxpayers put in the
authorities will rise.” On the other hand, if the sanctions are not credible and government
over uses their authority, trust in the administration can decline, and in that, tax evasion
increases. Thus, whether individuals perceive their government as effective, reinforcing the
perception that the quality of government is high, has important implications for the tax
compliance environment. (Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl 2008; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler
2010; Kastlunger et al. 2013; Torgler and Schneider 2009).
Effective institutions provide clear signals to taxpayers that administrations are credible and
trustworthy. On the other hand, corrupt institutions and a lack of governmental transparency
cause 1) uncertainty and 2) a reduction of trust in authorities. If we think about uncertainty
from a tax perspective, we can imagine a tax authority that lacks the administrative capacity
to implement credible sanctions. Taxpayers are then left doubting both whether they will be
sanctioned, and just as importantly, whether their fellow taxpayers will be audited. Bergman
(2009) comparing Chile and Argentina, demonstrates that credible sanctions in Chile were an
effective tool in improving the perception of government, and therefore, reducing evasion. In
another study, Torgler and Schneider (2009) use an extensive dataset, comprised of between
55-57 countries from the period 1990-1999 to demonstrate that government effectiveness has
the greatest effect on reducing the size of the shadow economy. Similarly, Torgler and Valev
(2006) suggest that a high level of corruption is correlated with high levels of tax evasion.
Effective institutions then provide some guarantee that the state is upholding their end of
the social contract.
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One argument for this is what many have called the “slippery slope” framework (Kirchler,
Hoelzl, and Wahl 2008; Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler 2010; Kastlunger et al. 2013). Ac-
cording to the “slippery slope” framework, tax compliance is contingent on the interaction
between the power of authorities to enforce tax rules and trust in the authorities. Formal
rules, such as audits and sanctions, are related to power, whereas the distribution of the tax
burden and public goods, procedural fairness, and social norms are more related to trust
in institutions. As Kastlunger et al. (2013: 38) eloquently state, “On one hand, legitimate
power is perceived high if tax crimes are detected in a reasonable way and tax authorities
combat tax crimes efficiently without harassment but due to their competence. On the
other hand, coercive power is perceived as high, if tax authorities combat tax evasion pri-
marily by draconic control and enforcement, if investigations are long and severe and the
only aim of adopted processes is to detect findings.” Amongst 389 Italian entrepreneurs and
self-employed individuals, Kastlunger et al. (2013) demonstrate that trust does increase com-
pliance, while coercive power was associated with higher levels of evasion. In other words,
administrations can work cooperatively with citizens or they can work in a more adversar-
ial way. Administrations that work cooperatively with citizens can garner more trust than
those who work from the baseline that everyone is going to cheat if they can get away with
it (Braithwaite 2003).
Trust then is a fundamental aspect of the tax compliance decision. There is a large body of
literature demonstrating that trust increases compliance to organizations’ rules and regula-
tions, both in the public and private sector (Murphy 2004; Braithwaite and Makkai 1994).
Trust, further, affects the extent to which individuals willingly comply to costly demands,
such as paying one’s taxes. Levi (1998) suggests that citizens are likely to trust government
granted they believe that the state will act in their best interest. Therefore, citizens will
perceive the state as trustworthy if they believe that the state will act in society’s interest.
Governments must guarantee procedural fairness and that their trust in the state is recip-
rocated. According to Feld and Frey (2002: 89) “the tax authorities must acknowledge and
support the contract with the taxpayers by acting in a respectful way towards them, but
also by preventing honest taxpayers from being exploited in the process.” Murphy (2004)
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demonstrates that a low level of trust was a significant predictor of resistance to the tax
authority among 6,000 Australian taxpayers. Moreover, Torgler (2007) utilizes a controlled
field experiment in Switzerland in which a test group of citizens receive a letter from the
Swiss government outlining the importance of paying taxes. He uncovered that tax compli-
ance when varying the tax rate is generally insignificant while trust in the legal system is
highly significant. Hence, in an environment with high trust, features of some tax systems
that might increase evasions, such as high tax rates, do not dissuade individuals from their
fiscal obligations. Feld and Frey (2002) conclude in their study of the Swiss tax authority
that trust is the basis for the psychological tax contract.
Tax compliance thus can be seen as an exchange relationship between the taxpayer and the
state. This relationship is twofold: On the one hand, the state must provide quality public
service and stable political institutions as to generate high trust and willingness to fund
those institutions. On the other hand, the taxpayer must reciprocate by providing enough
revenue to fund a modern and efficient state.
2 Explaining National Variation in Tax Compliance
There is a long history of scholarly literature which argues that socioeconomic differences
between countries can largely be explained by deep cultural differences (Almond and Verba
1963; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Tabellini 2010; Banfield 1967). These scholars
argue that countries who have historically lagged economically demonstrate what Banfield
(1967) has termed “amoral familism”. Within these countries, behaviors, such as sharing,
generosity, and trust, only extend to individuals tied by familial lineage or close friendship.
If applied to taxation, individuals from these countries would resist taxes, as contributions
to the public good through taxation are far removed from the family. On the other hand,
countries that demonstrate a positive civic culture – defined by Almond and Verba (1963) as
acceptance of the authority of the state and beliefs in participation in civic duties – would
be more likely to contribute to the state though taxation, as their ties are more outwardly
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facing and more likely to extend to the state. Though culture can be used as an appropriate
analytical tool to examine cross-national behaviors, it can also lead to overly generalized
stereotypes, such as the honest Swede or the dishonest Italian.
The tax literature that has specifically examined cross-national differences in attitudes to-
ward taxation has typically approached the topic by examining differences in tax morale.
Tax morale, according to Torgler (2007), is an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. Tax morale
usually considers social norms, ethical consideration, and attitudes toward government and
helps to explain the high levels of tax compliance that cannot be accounted for by typical ra-
tional choice models. These studies have unearthed important cultural differences between
countries, types of government, and also religious groups (Alm and Torgler 2006; Torgler
2006). One drawback to this approach, however, is that tax morale is formed through a
particular institutional context or lens, and thus, individuals’ tax morale is not constructed
independent of the institutional environment in which people live.
This is why the institutionalist literature is so important for helping us explain differences in
tax compliance (?D’Attoma 2018) Institutonalists argue that to understand differences be-
tween countries, scholars should look at how institutions frame and shape behavior (Steinmo,
Thelen, and Longstreth 1992). Institutions create the conditions that can generate volun-
tary tax compliance (Levi 1989) through both formal rules, such as audits, penalties, and
the responsiveness of government (Rothstein 1998) and also informal mechanisms, such as
social norms (Andrighetto et al. 2016).
People who have lived in more than one country for a considerable amount of time know that
we usually adapt to the combination of formal institutions and social norms of the society in
which we live. The same person might find it perfectly acceptable – albeit illegal – to run a
stop sign while in Italy, but unacceptable in the United States. This is due to differences in
enforcement (formal institutions) and social norms. The formal and informal are mutually
reinforcing, and over-time, can become features of culture, such as trust. I argue then
that much of what we understand about cross-national variation in tax compliance can be
explained by the dynamic process through which formal institutions, informal institutions,
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and culture interact.
3 Country Selection
Tax systems are hugely complex and to fully explain the similarities and differences between
countries would require an entire book, yet alone a section in this article. But given the
vast interest in cross-national behavioral experiments, tax compliance research has become
increasingly relevant, especially given that the tax compliance decision encompasses a range
of personal motivations. Furthermore, tax compliance varies widely across countries (Alm
and Torgler 2006), even across developed democracies.
There are several studies which examine tax compliance in Italy and the United States
compared to other European countries. Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995) conduct tax
compliance experiments in the United States and Spain, and Alm and Torgler (2006) utilize
the World Values Survey to examine tax morale in the same countries, generally uncovering
that Americans tend to be more tax compliant and demonstrate higher tax morale than
Spanish and European respondents. There have also been several cross-national studies
which utilize Italy compared to Great Britain (Lewis et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2016) and
Sweden (Andrighetto et al. 2016). The results to these studies are mixed. Lewis et al.
(2009) indicate British subjects were more compliant; Zhang et al. (2016) present compelling
evidence suggesting Italians are more compliant than Brits; and Andrighetto et al. (2016)
unearths that on average Swedes are not more compliant than Italians, but the behaviors
between the countries do differ, in that, Italians are more likely to fudge than Swedes. Most
recently, Alm et al. (2017) were interested in differences in tax compliance behavior in Italy
and the United States with respect to public disclosure. Due to the relative similarity of
the tax systems, but the large variation in tax behavior, and the somewhat ambiguous
cross-national results between Italy, the United States, and other European countries, tax
compliance experiments in which we leverage real world institutions in the United States
and Italy can provide a fruitful comparison.
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Other reasons to compare the two countries include the different tax burdens, institutional
quality, and perceptions of government. As I mentioned in the introduction, Italy has one
of the highest tax burdens in the OECD, as well as a high preponderance of tax evasion.
Indeed, the fight against tax evasion is a common theme among Italian politicians and
citizens (D’Attoma 2017). It is also referenced as the cause of many societal problems such
as reductions in public spending and inequality (Alm et al. 2017; Santoro and Fiorio 2010).
Moreover, Italy is a country plagued by ineffective governance and perceived to be relatively
corrupt. Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Index (2016) ranks Italy as
number 60 – one of the lowest in the OECD (Lambsdorff 1999).
In contrast, the United States has one of the lowest tax burdens in the OECD and tax evasion
is relatively low, especially compared to Italy. Tax evasion is rarely discussed in political
circles and not nearly as salient in the United States as it is in Italy. Though perceptions
of public institutions in the United States is on the decline, the Transparency International
Corruptions Perceptions Index (2016) ranks the United States as 18th – significantly lower
than Italy.
Moreover, The Quality of Government Institute (2016) has created a scale that combines
components measuring corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality. The scale scores
the US (.83) and Italy (.57). These scores reflect important variation in the context of tax
compliance.
4 Experimental Design
Our experimental design follows the basic elements of most tax compliance experiments (Alm
2010; Alm, McKee, and Beck 1990).1 First, subjects earn money and are asked to report
their income. At the end of the experiment, reported income is subject to a random audit,
and if audited, underreported income is subject to a fine. Final income is thus equal to the
earned income plus the share of the group fund (detailed below), minus taxes levied and
fines.
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The experimental design consisted of two stages, with three reporting rounds in each stage,
and thus a total of six reporting rounds. Each stage implements changes in the experimental
treatment. It should be noted that we did not randomize, nor control for possible ordering
effects in the first three rounds of the experiment. In a within subject design this is problem-
atic because decisions made in previous rounds could affect decisions in subsequent rounds.
As Harrison et al. (2005) suggest,
“The primary methodological contribution of experiments in economics is to en-
hance control. Ideally, such control makes the explanatory variables of interest,
in this case scale, orthogonal to other explanatory variables such as order, allow-
ing clearer inferences about behavior than one could get from field econometric
data. We argue that not controlling for order effects results in a misspecification
of utility functions that is as important as that of scale.”
Existing evidence is mixed, however. While there are number of studies that demonstrate
that order has an effect on decision making (Harrison et al. 2005; Bradley and Daly 1994;
Scheufele and Bennett 2013; Carlsson, Mørkbak, and Olsen 2012), there are also many studies
that demonstrate little or no ordering effects (Brazell and Louviere 1997; Arentze et al. 2003;
Oppewal et al. 2010; Day et al. 2012). Most relevant to our research, Bruner, D’Attoma,
and Steinmo (2017) uncover no ordering effects in a controlled tax compliance experiment
with a public good, and indicate that regardless of order there is an increase in compliance
when the public good multiplier is increased from zero.
In the first stage of the experiment we manipulate the payoff, while in the second round
we vary the public institution to which subjects contribute. At the beginning of stage one,
participants were asked to perform a simple clerical task for which they copied a line of
fictitious names from a piece of paper to the computer screen. For each correctly copied row,
participants earned 10 currency units that would later be exchanged for domestic currency
at an exchange rate of 0.01 per token.
After subjects preformed the five-minute clerical task in stage one, we presented subjects with
an example of how their income would be calculated based on the experimental parameter,
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followed by a reporting screen. They were informed that the tax rate would be 30%, the audit
probability would be 5%, and the fine, if audited and detected cheating, would be twice the
taxes evaded. We only reveal the results of the audits at the conclusion of the experiment.
Participants are not provide with any information about whether other participants are
audited, nor whether other participants are honestly declaring their own incomes to limit
the effects of conditional cooperation. In the first stage, they were also informed of the
payoff they would receive from their contribution to the public good. In round 1, participants
received nothing in return for tax payments. In round 2, their money was collected, summed,
and put into a general fund which was then redistributed equally too all participants. Finally,
in round 3, the money was collected, summed, and put into a general fund. But this time
the fund was divided into two portions: One part (80%) was allocated to portion A, and a
second part (20%) was allocated to portion B. All of the money in portion A was distributed
in equal parts to all of the participants, regardless of how much each participant earned, and
how much they put into the fund. The money in portion B was distributed in equal parts
to the lowest 20% of income earners, regardless of how much each person in this group put
into the fund.
For stage two of the experiment we maintained a tax rate of 30% with the same audit
probability and fine. However, in this stage, subjects were asked to perform a four-minute
clerical task before each reporting round. In this stage, there was no public good, but
instead, their tax revenues would be sent directly to their real world public institutions.
In a real sense, there was an actual public good attached to this stage, since we did send
all revenues to the public institutions at the end of the experiment. We randomize stage
two for each respondent to limit any anchoring effects. Czajkowski, Giergiczny, and Greene
(2014) suggest that by using a counterbalance design in which each respondent is presented
with a randomized order, potential learning or anchoring effects are canceled out for the
sample, and experimenters can minimize the ordering effects. Subjects were informed that
their reported income would be assessed a 30% tax rate with a 5% audit probability, and the
revenue collected would be sent to the national government, national pension scheme, and
the fire department. To reiterate: Institutions were randomized, and all subjects received a
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clerical task before each institutional round in stage two (See table A.1 in the appendix for
a summary of the rounds).
The experiments were conducted in five universities in the United States and four in Italy.
Subjects were recruited through a common recruitment system called, Online Recruitment
System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE) (Greiner 2004), and the experiments were
programmed in Behavery. Sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes with average earnings in
Italy of 13.55 Euro and average earnings in the United States of 15.33 dollars plus a 5 Dollars
or 5 Euro show-up fee. Payment structure was based on 1.5 times the country’s minimum
wage. There were more females in the U.S.; Americans were significantly more likely to be
employed; Italians were slightly more risk averse and older; and finally, Americans copied
significantly more rows as indicated by the income variable. In total there were 694 subjects
(U.S. = 424, Italy = 270), as shown in table 2 with further participant characteristics.2
[Table 2 about here.]
Upon completion of the experiment, subjects were asked to take a short 10-minute survey.
The survey collected demographic information, as well as information regarding trust and
attitudes towards taxation. Subjects were then paid at the end of the survey.
4.1 Why these institutions?
We chose these specific institutions based on the institutions that we assumed would elicit
the strongest behavioral response. Although we believed that confidence in the national
government (Treasury (US) and Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (Italy), pension
system (Social Security (US) and Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (Italy), and
fire and rescue services (Fire Department (US) and Vigili del fuoco (Italy)) would vary
between countries, we also believed that each of these institutions would generate particularly
strong responses within countries. Moreover, with the exception of the fire department, both
the Treasury (Ministry of Economy and Finance) and the pension funds have very similar
functions in both countries and are federal level institutions.
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However, coming up with an institution that we thought would elicit strong feelings and be
considered a positive governmental institution was a difficult task. After informally surveying
Italian and American colleagues, friends, and random strangers we opted to go with the fire
and rescue service, even though in the United States it is administered locally and in Italy
it is administered federally. From our conversations in both countries, fire and rescue were
both considered to be positive institutions and to perform more or less the same functions.
Although I do not have comparable data on perceptions of the Italian fire and Rescue Service,
according to a Pew Research Poll 86 percent of those polled in the U.S. said that the fire
department is doing an excellent job (see Rainie et al. 2011).
It could be argued then that we are measuring willingness to contribute to the local govern-
ment vs. the national government when comparing these institutions in the two countries.
Although possible, we are interested in how perceptions of governmental institutions affect
tax compliance, and therefore, whether the institution is administered locally or federally is
less important than whether individuals perceive these institutions as either good or bad. It
is important that individuals have a particular set of beliefs and attitudes about how well
these institutions function.
5 Hypotheses
Based on the institutionalist argument that institutions structure behavior and give signals
to individuals about expected behaviors, I expect that institutional rules will affect behavior
independent of national culture. More specifically, the no-pot round (round-one), in which
there is zero payoff from contributions to the public good, will elicit lower compliance than
rounds in which there is redistribution or taxes go directly to real world institutions. More-
over, when given the exact same incentives and asked to make the same decisions in rounds
one through three, the average compliance rate will be significantly greater in the United
States than in Italy. This is based on the commonly held belief that Americans generally
have high tax morale, whereas Italians are more non-compliant (Alm and Torgler 2006).
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Indeed, tax behavior in the real world bears these differences.
Moreover, given that the quality of public institutions is perceived to be considerably higher
in the United States than in Italy, tax compliance will be significantly higher in the United
States in the rounds for which subjects have to contribute to their real world institutions.
Specifically, Americans tend to be more trusting of their federal institutions than Italian
citizens (see Wike et al. 2017 and figure 1 from our post-experiment questionnaire). Although
comparable survey data is not available on confidence in pension funds, our post-survey
questionnaire does demonstrate a significant difference between Americans and Italians. I,
therefore, predict Americans to be more compliant in the pension fund round than Italians.
Americans should also be significantly more compliant than Italians in the fire and rescue
round. Although, compliance in the fire department round should be high in both countries,
Americans are uniquely supportive of their fire department.
[Figure 1 about here.]
There should also be a stronger effect in Italy than the U.S. when increasing the pay-off to
the public good. The literature has accounted for several reasons for why attitudes towards
redistribution vary between countries, including ethnic heterogeneity (Alesina and Glaeser
2004), culture (Lipset 1997), and institutions (Esping-Andersen 2013). This should result in
more responsiveness to increase in the pay-off from taxation in Italy. I also hypothesize a
stronger positive effect for Americans when we introduce the national government, pension
fund, and the fire department. Finally, because individuals with higher levels of trust in
institutions believe that government will fulfill its duty in the tax contract (see Feld and Frey
2002), high trust individuals will be more likely to reciprocate with higher tax compliance
than low trust individuals.3
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6 Experimental Analysis
In the section, I provide a set of analyses to test how perception of public institutions affects
tax compliance. For the first part of the analysis, I examine whether average tax compliance
varies between countries and between experimental treatment. I proceed by investigating the
distribution of decisions, which tells us a bit more about the behavioral differences between
countries. This is followed by individual level statistical tests. Finally, I test the country
and round interactions. In other words, I examine whether individuals from Italy respond
differently to the experimental treatment than participants in the United States.
6.1 Overall Analysis
I begin the analysis by reporting the average reported income across rounds, pooling the
total dataset. I test whether there is variation in the experimental parameters. Although
from figure 2 the treatments do not seem to elicit large behavioral differences, there does
seem to be some significant variance between rounds.4
Next, I report the average compliance rate for each treatment in each individual country in
figure 2. Here I investigate if Italians are indeed less tax compliant than Americans in each
individual round. Although real-world evidence demonstrates that Italians will be less tax
compliant, recent experimental studies exhibit, however, that under certain contexts Italians
are actually more tax compliant than Brits (Zhang et al. 2016) and Americans (Alm et al.
2017) in experiments; and they do not demonstrate significantly different tax compliance
rates than Swedes (Andrighetto et al. 2016). Both Alm et al. (2017) and Andrighetto et al.
(2016) uncover interesting behavioral differences as well, such as Italians were more likely to
fudge than Swedes. Figure 3 demonstrates prima facie evidence that Americans tend to be
more compliant than Italians, except when asked to contribute to a public good in rounds
two and three.5
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[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
However, a different picture emerges when examining the compliance rate in each individual
round.6 Here the results are intriguing. In the no-pot round, Americans are significantly
more compliant than Italians. But when the public good is introduced in rounds two and
three, Italians become just as tax compliant as Americans. In the institutional rounds,
though, Italians are significantly less willing to contribute to their real world institutions
than Americans. In fact, Italians are only slightly more compliant in the national government
round than in the no-pot round in which participants are essentially burning their money. I
believe that this result speaks a great deal to the association between institutional quality
and tax compliance.
6.2 Distribution of Decisions
However, averages do not tell us much about the distribution of decisions. It is, therefore,
important to examine the distribution of complete evaders, complete compliers, and partial
evasion decisions. I test if the difference between countries is being driven by the percentage
of complete compliers, complete evaders, or “fudgers” (i.e. Andrighetto et al. 2016). Table
3 exhibits this distribution. Columns 1 through 3 display the proportion of decisions in
each round characterized as complete evasion. Here, a significantly greater percentage of
Italian participants’ decisions are complete evasion in the no-pot round (round 1) and the
institutions rounds (rounds four-six). The difference is particularly great in the National
Government round with a gap of 13 percent. In columns 4 through 6, I display the proportion
of decisions in each round characterized by 100 percent compliance. Under this condition, a
significantly greater percentage of American participants’ decision are characterized by full
compliance in the no-pot round and the institutions rounds with a particularly large gap (16
percent) in the fire and rescue service round. In columns 7-9, I present the proportion of
decisions in each round classified as partial evasion. By partial evasion, I mean subjects are
17
More Bang for Your Buck
neither 100 percent compliant nor 100 non-compliant; participants reports some income, but
not all income. Only in the no-pot round are there significant differences between the United
States and Italy, and the gap is quite small (3 percent). Finally, in columns 10 through 12, I
examine the percent of income declared by partial evaders. In other words, how much does
the subset of partial evaders report on average? I detect no significant differences between
countries, and thus, can conclude that the gap between countries, especially in the no-pot
and institutions rounds, is being driven by those who report all or nothing.
[Table 3 about here.]
6.3 Individual Level Analysis
I now proceed to the individual level models to examine if the variation is robust to differences
in participant characteristics. Following Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2015) and Zhang
et al. (2016), I report results for a subject random effects generalized least squares estimation
with standard errors corrected for clustering at the individual level:
Yi,j = β0 + β1U.S.i + β2Incomei,j + β3Xi + ψt + ui + i,j
where Yi,j represents the percentage of earned income declared by subject i in decision
round j, US is a dummy variable for subjects in the United States, Incomei,j is participant
i ’s earned income in round j ; Xi denotes a vector of demographic variables including gender,
age, employment status, past participation in experiments, self-reported risk measure, factor
indexes for Trust, Pro-redistribution, and Duty to Pay Taxes (See Pampel, Andrighetto,
and Steinmo 2017 for explanation of how the indexes were created.),; ψj is a set of J − 1
dummies that capture round fixed effects (model 1); ui are random effects that control for
unobservable individual characteristics; and i,j is an individual-round error term.
[Table 4 about here.]
According to the estimates in column 1, American subjects report on average and across
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rounds, 6 percentage points more income than their Italian counterparts, all else being equal.
Furthermore, there is a significant positive coefficient in each treatment when comparing
them to the no-pot round, which further validates the experimental design. In columns 2-5,
I examine the compliance rate when introducing a public good. Therefore, I only analyze
rounds one through three in which a public good is introduced to the participants. Here,
contrary to my predictions, the results are null. When contributing to the public good
there are no significant differences between Italians and Americans, controlling for a host of
individual characteristics. This is interesting considering previous literatures demonstrate
that Americans are generally more compliant and have higher tax morale than European
countries. I will elaborate this further as I examine the treatment effects in the following
table. In columns 3-4, I introduce several controls, and in column 5, I include my full model.
There are a several variables that stand out in column 5. For example, participants who
agree more with policies that promote redistribution are also more tax compliant. Moreover,
women are more compliant than men, confirming a large body of literature on tax compliance
(Giese and Hoffmann 2000; Torgler 2002; Ge¨rxhani 2007; Bruner, D’Attoma, and Steinmo
2017; D’Attoma, Volintiru, and Steinmo 2017). Finally, individuals who enjoy taking risks
and have past experience with behavioral experiments are less tax compliant on average in
rounds 1-3.7
In columns 6-9, I test whether Italians are less willing to contribute to their real-world
institutions than Americans. Whereas in the first three rounds all subjects in both countries
were making the same decision and contributing to a public good that would be shared
among everyone, in rounds four through six, participants were asked to pay taxes to their
real public institutions. The basic premise behind this task was to examine if asking subjects
to contribute to their real world public institutions, elicited patterns that were more similar
to the real world. Indeed, American subjects are significantly more compliant when paying
taxes to their real world institutions than Italians. This holds across models 6-8. When I
include employment status, past-participation, income, and age to the model in column 9,
the differences are no longer significant. It is also notable that although pro-redistribution
was positive and significant in the abstract tax rounds, it is not significant in the institutions
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rounds. On the other hand, while trust was not significant in the abstract tax rounds one
through three, trust now becomes an important predictor of tax compliance in the public
institution rounds.
[Table 5 about here.]
6.4 Country and Round Interactions
Finally, in table 5, I estimate the interaction between the decision round and country. The
estimation equation is mainly the same as in table 4 with the inclusion of controls and
added treatment interactions. In column 1, I estimate the model without any individual
level controls. Here, Americans comply on average 9 percentage points more than Italians in
the no-pot round. Moreover, Italians increase their compliance significantly from the no-pot
round to all other rounds, except for the round in which the are paying taxes to the national
government. Interestingly, Italians do not demonstrate a significant difference in compliance
from the no-pot round in which the money is burned compared to the national government
round. Examining the interaction terms, however, the difference-in-difference on the US*Pot
and US*Prog coefficients are significant, meaning that the effect of introducing a public good
or a pay-off to the public good is stronger in Italy than in the United States. Specifically,
examining predicted probabilities for the compliance rate in figures 4a and 4b, we can observe
that Italians increase their compliance by 18 percent when the public good is introduced in
rounds 2 and 3. For Americans, there is a much smaller increase. This makes sense since
Italians generally are in favor of more social spending (Kuhn 2012) and social spending makes
up a much larger percent of the Italian economy. According to the OECD (2016), while social
spending in the United States only accounts for approximately 19.3 percent of GDP, in Italy
social spending represents approximately 28.9 percent of GDP. Only Belgium, Finland, and
France spend more than Italians. I cannot tease out what is driving the stronger response
in Italy, but these results demonstrate that Italians are more responsive to redistribution
than Americans. These findings are robust to a host of controls in columns 2 through 4.
Moreover, there are not large differences within countries between the institutional rounds,
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with one exception: the fire department in the U.S. The fire department round in the U.S.
elicits significantly greater compliance than all other experimental treatments in the United
States. This speaks to the exceptional popularity of the fire department in the United
States.
In contrast to the interaction between country and the public goods rounds, there are no
significant treatment effects in the institutions rounds, meaning that Italians and Americans
respond similarly to the experimental treatment in those rounds. But while the interactions
are not significant, figure 4a demonstrates the levels of compliance are significantly greater
in the national government round and the fire department round in the United States, as
expected. Referring to figure 4b, the predicted compliance rate in the national government
round in the United States is approximately 60 percent, while in Italy it is around 50 percent.
Italians contribute nearly 13 percent less to the fire department as well. These results are
consistent across models 2 through 4.
In column 5, I add a variable which gauges trust in institutions. Here, I am testing whether
trust in government predicts tax compliance, and whether differing levels of trust in govern-
ment are driving the differences in tax compliance between the U.S. and Italy. First, trust
in institutions is a significant predictor of tax compliance, which confirms a large body of
literature. Moreover, when introducing the trust in institutions variable to the equation, the
significant differences that were uncovered in models 1-4, are no longer present in column
5 when controlling for trust in institutions. Finally, from figure 4b it becomes apparent
that the differences in compliance observed in figure 4a in the institutional rounds are no
longer significant. This result, however, is somewhat limited by the fact that the trust in
institutions variable could be affected by the experimental treatment that was conducted
prior to the survey. For example, people who were non-compliant in the tax compliance ex-
periment might rationalize their non-compliance, post-treatment, by saying that they were
non-compliant because they do not trust their institutions. Further research is needed to
test whether these results hold when the survey is conducted prior to the experiment.
[Figure 4 about here.]
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7 Robustness Check
For a final robustness check, I examine the compliance rate in each individual round using
Ordinary Least Squares clustered by each subject.8 Again, there are only significant differ-
ences between Americans and Italians in the institutions round, and when controlling for
trust in institutions, those differences disappear.
In sum, Americans tend to be more tax compliant than Italians overall. However, a different
picture emerges when examining specific conditions of the experiment. Italians are not less
compliant than Americans when their money is sent to an abstract public good (rounds
1-3), and, in fact, Italians increase their compliance more than Americans when introducing
a public good to the experiment. But, behaviors tend to diverge when we ask participants
to pay taxes to their actual public institutions. Though this supports the argument that
individuals are willing to pay for the quality of government that they believe they will receive,
trust in those institutions also plays a crucial role in the tax compliance decision.
8 Discussion and Conclusions
This study aimed to examine how perceptions of public institutions affect tax compliance. I
argued that differences between countries can be largely explained by individuals’ perception
of their country’s public institutions. I investigated this by studying two countries that lie at
opposite ends of the tax compliance and institutional quality continuum: the United States
and Italy. By using a simple tax compliance experiment in which subjects in the U.S. and
Italy are asked to make an identical tax decision for three rounds and then asked to pay
taxes to their real world institutions for three rounds, I have uncovered that given identical
tax decisions, Italians behave on average in a similar way, but when asked to pay taxes to
their real world institutions those behaviors diverge.
While much prior work on tax compliance investigates the effects of enforcement, penalties,
trust, and the allocation of a public good on tax compliance (Alm, Jackson, and McKee
22
More Bang for Your Buck
1992; Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan 1995; Santoro and Fiorio 2010), I have yet to come
across a study which examines tax behavior when contributing to real public institutions.
This experimental design allows researchers to test whether some countries are more or less
willing to contribute to their specific institutions. I believe the extent that citizens are willing
to contribute to those institutions is directly related to citizens’ trust in those institutions.
Steinmo (2018), for example, suggests by providing successful public institutions, states can
earn citizens’ trust, and as such, bring down monitoring and administrative costs. Therefore,
tax compliance can be seen as a co-evolutionary process between institutions and national
culture.
On the other hand, it’s reasonable to assume then that an environment characterized by
negative perception of government and low trust elicits behaviors that are not conducive
to tax compliance. According to Steinmo (2018), “what citizens believe about their state
is in large measure defined by what their state has done and how it has behaved toward
them in the past. Simply put, states that have low capacity to enforce their laws and rules
tend to have citizens who distrust that state. When citizens distrust their state it is difficult
for the state to collect the revenues that could make the citizen more satisfied with their
state.”
It is plausible then that the problem of tax evasion stems from low institutional quality which
feeds distrust, and distrust reduces tax compliance. Potentially, we can think of trust as a
mediator variable between institutions and tax compliance, meaning institutions affect trust
in government and trust is causing tax compliance. The fact that trust eliminates the effect
of country on tax compliance in my model, suggests a mediation effect. Further research
should be done to investigate the mediating effects of trust, and whether this relationship is
causal or correlation.
Further, this speaks to the importance of citizens’ perception of governmental institutions
for creating a positive tax compliance environment On the one hand, the fact that Italians
seem to be just as willing to share with others as Americans in an abstract tax situation
leads me to more optimistic policy implications. If it is the case that poor institutional
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quality shapes negative perception of government, and in that, low trust, than the problem
requires institutional fixes. In this case, increasing transparency by specifying what citizens’
tax money is funding has proven to be successful (Stanley and Hartman 2017). Another
option could be to give citizens more direct control of how their tax money is spent through
voting. Torgler (2002), for example, has demonstrated that direct democracy does limit tax
evasion.
On the other hand, institutions are sticky. Over time, institutions generate norms and
behaviors that become hard-wired into society. Similarly, trust can be seen as a product of
how a particular set of institutions evolved over time. Examining the coevolution of state
and society can provide researchers with a good glimpse into why trust varies so greatly
between countries. However, this also means that trust in government is not something
that is easily had, nor is it something that is easily sustained over time. Trust, though, is
an essential feature of any decision that requires cooperation. It is therefore necessary for
scholars to examine the mechanisms that can rebuild trust. This coupled with improvements
to institutional quality can go along way in establishing a more positive tax compliance
environment.
Finally, because of the vast scale of this experiment, our team made methodological sacri-
fices to increase the size of the experiment and make sure the experiment was carried out
identically in all locations, which has also led to some limitations. Future research that
examines cross-national differences in tax compliance could build and improve on this design
in the following ways: First, we did not reorder the treatments, and thus our design could
be affected by sequencing effects, such as anchoring. For reasons provided above, I do not
believe that this should have had a large effect on our results, but nonetheless, future studies
should control for these sequencing effects. Maybe most importantly, it is essential that re-
searchers limit post-treatment bias when conducting experiments. Montgomery, Nyhan, and
Torres (2016) demonstrate that nearly 50 percent of studies published in the top political sci-
ence journals that utilize a controlled treatment design report findings with post-treatment
bias. Unfortunately, my measure for trust in institutions was also measured post-treatment
and therefore could have been influenced by the experiment. Further research, will have to
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address these issues.
This study has demonstrated that it is important for researchers to provide real world in-
stitutional context to subjects when making tax decisions, because the perceptions of these
institutions elicit different behaviors. When comparing countries, subsequent studies should
also pay careful attention to the political context at the time of conducting the experiment.
Cross-national experiments are extremely vulnerable to context, and thus, researchers need
to be aware of context and timing that might affect participants behaviors. Finally, further
research exploiting similar designs should use institutions that elicit the greatest behavioral
response between and within countries. We carefully selected these institutions for this rea-
son, but there is room for further research and designs utilizing different institutions that can
disentangle the causal effects of perception and trust on compliance and cooperation.
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Notes
1The experiments were conducted by a team of researchers funded by the (anonymized grant) from
the (anonymized university). Because the experiments were conducted by a team of researchers, I will
use the plural “we” or “our” when discussing the experimental design. The experimental sites included
Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social Sciences, Centro d’Economia Sperimentale A Roma Est,
and Experimental Economics Lab of the University of Milano Bicocca in Italy, Learning & Experimental
Economics Projects at University of California-Santa Cruz, Social Science Experiments Lab at University
of Colorado-Boulder, Appalachian Experimental Economics Laboratory in Boone, North Carolina, Center
for Behavioral Political Economy in Stony Brook, New York, and University of Hawaii Laboratory for
Computer-Mediated Experiments and the Study of Culture in Honolulu, Hawaii, in the US.
2See the appendix for examples of the clerical task, payment screen, and reporting screen, see figures ??,
A.4, and A.5.
3It should be noted that the instrument that I use to measure trust in institutions is generated post-
treatment and could therefore suffer from post-treatment bias.
4Compared to the baseline (no pot) round, all treatments elicit significantly greater compliance than in
round-one at .05, with the exception of the national government round which is significant at .1. Compliance
in round-two (redistribution) is significantly greater than in the no-pot (round-one) and the national gov-
ernment round (round-four), but not the other rounds. The same is true with the progressive redistribution
round (round-three). Asking individuals to contribute to their national government significantly reduces
compliance from the redistribution round, and is also significantly less than in the pension round (round-
five) and fire and rescue rounds (round-six). Compliance in the pension round is significantly different from
all but the redistribution rounds. Finally, compliance in the fire and rescue service round is not significantly
different from the redistribution rounds, but is significantly higher than in the no-pot round and the other
institutional rounds.
5The t-test in table 2 provides further evidence that Americans are more tax compliant overall.
6The t-tests A.3 in the appendix demonstrate the compliance rate in each country and individual
round.
7Risk attitudes, is measured by a post-experimental survey item which asks subjects to rank themselves
on a 10-point scale, with 1 signifying a person who “normally tries to avoid taking risks” and 10 signifying
someone who is “completely willing to take risks.” Past-participation is a dummy variable for whether a
participant has either participated in economics experiments before or not.
8The results are presented in table A.3 in the appendix.
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Table 1: Percentage of Citizens Rating Institutions as “Corrupt” or “Very Corrupt”
24 Advanced Industrial Countries
Rank Country Year Education Judiciary Health Police Civil Service Average
1 Denmark 2013 6% 5% 13% 9% 11% 9%
2 Sweden 2007 5% 13% 12% 14% (n.a.) 11%
3 Finland 2013 7% 9% 17% 5% 25% 13%
4 Austria 2010 11% 15% (n.a.) 17% 22% 16%
5 Switzerland 2013 11% 14% 22% 13% 23% 17%
6 Norway 2013 13% 9% 33% 16% 29% 20%
7 Netherlands 2010 11% 23% (n.a.) 17% 30% 20%
8 New Zealand 2013 16% 20% 17% 24% 25% 20%
9 Iceland 2010 16% 27% (n.a.) 10% 51% 26%
10 Canada 2013 20% 25% 24% 27% 38% 27%
11 Australia 2013 19% 28% 20% 33% 35% 27%
12 Luxembourg 2013 21% 24% 21% 29% 40% 27%
13 UK 2013 18% 24% 19% 32% 45% 28%
14 Ireland 2010 17% 24% (n.a.) 35% 45% 30%
15 Spain 2013 11% 51% 14% 37% 42% 31%
16 Germany 2013 19% 20% 48% 20% 49% 31%
17 South Korea 2013 30% 38% 21% 35% 36% 32%
18 France 2013 16% 34% 28% 41% 48% 33%
19 Belgium 2013 17% 43% 22% 41% 51% 35%
20 US 2013 34% 42% 43% 42% 55% 43%
21 Italy 2013 29% 47% 54% 27% 61% 44%
22 Portugal 2013 35% 66% 36% 38% 46% 44%
23 Japan 2013 55% 29% 47% 61% 66% 52%
24 Greece 2013 45% 66% 73% 56% 66% 61%
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Reports (various years).
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Table 2: Participant Characteristics: US and Italy
Obs Mean sd Min Max Italy US Diff
Avg. Reported Income 694 .597 .44 0 1 .561 .62 -.059
(-4.233*)
Female 4164.000 0.523 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.441 0.575 -0.135
(*-8.486)
Past-participation 4164.000 0.659 0.474 0.000 1.000 0.774 0.585 0.189
(*12.550)
Employed 4164.000 0.349 0.477 0.000 1.000 0.104 0.505 -0.401
(*-26.473)
Trust 4164.000 -0.000 1.000 -3.088 2.775 -0.454 0.289 -0.743
(*-24.566)
Pro-redistribution 4164.000 0.000 1.000 -3.062 2.216 0.039 -0.025 0.064
(*2.100)
Duty to Pay 4164.000 -0.000 1.000 -4.244 1.754 0.289 -0.184 0.474
(*15.092)
Risk 4164.000 5.996 2.243 0.000 10.000 5.726 6.167 -0.442
(*-6.084)
Age 4164.000 21.385 3.676 18.000 57.000 23.070 20.311 2.759
(*25.996)
Income 4164.000 8.191 2.738 0.000 20.000 7.459 8.657 -1.198
(*-14.943)
Schlag’s Z-test and t-tests to test for country-level differences. An asterisk (*) indicates whether differences
between countries are statistically significant at the 5% level..
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Table 3: Distribution of Complete Evasion, Complete Compliance and Partial Evasion De-
cisions
% of Income
No. of Decisions: No. of Decisions: No. of Decisions: Declared by
Complete Evasion Complete Compliance Partial Evasion Partial Evaders:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Italy US Diff. Italy US Diff. Italy US Diff. Italy US Diff.
R1: No Redistribuiton 0.37 0.28 0.09* 0.31 0.37 -0.06* 0.32 0.35 -0.03* 0.49 0.51 -0.02
R2: Redistribution 0.21 0.25 -0.03 0.49 0.43 0.05 0.30 0.32 -0.02 0.52 0.51 0.01
R3: Prog. Redistribution 0.21 0.23 -0.01 0.49 0.46 0.03 0.29 0.31 -0.02 0.51 0.54 -0.03
R4: National Gov. 0.39 0.26 0.13* 0.36 0.44 -0.08* 0.25 0.30 -0.05 0.52 0.53 -0.01
R5: Pension 0.31 0.24 0.07* 0.42 0.51 -0.09* 0.27 0.25 0.02 0.49 0.51 -0.02
R6: Fire and Rescue 0.31 0.21 0.10* 0.44 0.60 -0.16* 0.25 0.19 0.06 0.53 0.53 0.00
N Italy = 270; N US = 422.
Schlag’s Z-test to test for country-level differences in columns (3), (6) and (9), and Mann-Whitney tests in column (12).
* indicates whether differences between countries are statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 4: GLS with Random Effects: Average Reported Income for Each Subject in Each
Decision Round
All Rounds Pooled Rounds 1-3 Rounds 4-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
United States 0.06* 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.11** 0.11** 0.07* 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
R2-Single Pot 0.10**
(0.01)
R3-Prog. Redistribution 0.12**
(0.01)
R4-National Gov. 0.04**
(0.01)
R5- Pension 0.09**
(0.02)
R6- Fire 0.14**
(0.02)
Trust 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06* 0.08** 0.06*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Pro-Redistribution 0.10** 0.08** 0.07** 0.11** 0.09** 0.08**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Duty to pay 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female 0.22** 0.22** 0.23** 0.22**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Risk -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Past-participation -0.13** -0.13**
(0.03) (0.03)
Employed 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Income -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.48** 0.58** 0.57** 0.49** 0.61** 0.54** 0.54** 0.45** 0.60**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.13) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12)
Number of Decisions 4,147 2,073 2,073 2,073 2,073 2,074 2,074 2,074 2,074
Number of Participants 694 691 691 691 691 694 694 694 694
Wald χ2 123.2 0.131 32.71 103.8 149.6 12.24 59.62 138.1 214.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
38
More Bang for Your Buck
Table 5: GLS with Random Effects: Average Reported Income for Each Subject in Each
Decision Round
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
US 0.09* 0.10** 0.09** 0.08* 0.06
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Pot 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Progressive 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
National 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Pension 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Fire 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
US*Pot -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.13** -0.13**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
US*Prog -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
US*Natl 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
US*Pension 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
US*Fire 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Pro-redistribution 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Duty to Pay 0.07** 0.06** 0.06** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)
Past-participation -0.13** -0.13**
(0.03) (0.03)
Risk -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.22** 0.22** 0.22**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Employed 0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Income in experiment -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Trust in Institutions 0.03 0.03*
(0.02) (0.01)
Constant 0.46** 0.45** 0.34** 0.51** 0.51**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.11)
Number of Decisions 4,147 4,147 4,147 4,147 4,147
Number of Participants 694 694 694 694 694
Wald χ2 153.7 204.9 298.4 387.7 408.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Figure 1: Bar Graph of Trust in Institutions in Italy and the U.S.
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Note: On the Y axis in figure 1 are Trust in institutions, which are generated from our post-experimental survey. Responses range from 1 to 10
with 1 meaning no confidence and 10 being absolute confidence.
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Figure 2: Average Reported Income Overall
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Figure 3: Average Reported Income by Country
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities for the Compliance Rate
(a) Predicted Probabilities for Compliance Rate (no trust control)
(b) Predicted Probabilities for Compliance Rate (w/ trust control)
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